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Sell v. United States: 
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause Does Not Allow Involuntary 
Administration of Antipsychotic Drugs to Render a Mentally III Defendant 
Competent to Stand Trial Where it is Unknown Whether the Side Effects are 
Likely to Undermine the Trial's Fairness 
The United States Supreme 
.lCourt held the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause 
does not allow involuntary 
administration of antipsychotic 
drugs to render a mentally ill 
defendant competent to stand trial 
where it is unknown whether the 
side effects are likely to undermine 
the trial's fairness. Sell v. United 
States, 123 S.Ct. 2174 (2003). 
The Court ruled antipsychotic drug 
treatment can only be administered 
if it is medically appropriate, 
substantially unlikely to have side 
effects that may undermine the 
defendant's right to a fair trial, and 
necessary to significantly further 
important governmental trial-related 
interests while taking into account 
less intrusive alternatives. Id. at 
2184-85. 
Charles Sell ("Sell") was a 
practicing dentist with an extensive 
history of mental illness. In May 
1997, Sell was charged with sub-
mitting fictitious insurance claims, 
mail fraud, Medicaid fraud, and 
money laundering. A federal 
magistrate judge ordered Sell to 
undergo a psychiatric examination 
and eventually concluded Sell was 
competent, even if he could ex-
perience a future psychotic episode. 
In April 1998, Sell was charged with 
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the attempted murder of the FBI 
agent who had arrested him and a 
witness who was to testify against 
him. Sell requested a reconsider-
ation of his competency and the 
magistrate sent him to the United 
States Medical Center for Federal 
Prisoners ("Center"). The Center 
determined Sell was mentally 
incompetent to stand trial. He was 
ordered to remain at the Center for 
four months. The Center recom-
mended antipsychotic drug treat-
ment, which Sell refused. 
Subsequently, the magistrate 
held a hearing regarding treatment 
and issued a pretrial order, which 
stated the only way to keep Sell 
from being dangerous to himself and 
others was to involuntarily admini-
ster antipsychotic drugs. The 
magistrate stayed the order, how-
ever, so Sell could appeal. The 
United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Missouri affirmed. 
The government and Sell appealed to 
the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed. 
The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to determine 
whether involuntarily administering 
antipsychotic drugs to render Sell 
competent to stand trial unconsti-
tutionally deprived Sell of his liberty 
to reject such treatment. 
The Court first considered whether 
the court of appeals had jurisdiction 
over Sell's appeal. Id. at 2181-83. 
The general rule, pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291, permits federal 
courts of appeals to review [mal de-
cisions of district courts. Id. at 2181. 
However, in this case there was no 
final decision, just the magistrate's 
order. Thus, the Court reviewed the 
"collateral order" exception, which 
allows appellate review when an 
order (1) conclusively determines the 
disputed question, (2) resolves an 
important issue completely separate 
from the merits of the action, and (3) 
is effectively unreviewable on appeal 
from a final judgment. Id. at 2182. 
The Court held the court of appeals 
did have jurisdiction because the 
order conclusively determined the 
disputed question of "whether Sell 
ha[ d] a legal right to avoid forced 
medication." Id. at 2182. The sec-
ond element was satisfied because 
"involuntary medical treatment raises 
questions of clear constitutional 
importance." Id. Finally, since Sell 
would have undergone forced 
medication before his trial began, the 
issue was "effectively unreviewable 
on appeal from a final judgment." 
Id. 
The Court acknowledged the 
standard for involuntarily admini-
stering antipsychotic drugs applied 
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by Washington v. Harper, 494 
U.S. 210 (1990) and Riggins v. 
Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992). Id. 
at 2183-85. Thisstandardsuggests 
forced administration of anti-
psychotic drugs is appropriate to 
render a mentally ill defendant 
competent to stand trial if the 
treatment is medically appropriate, 
substantially unlikely to have side 
effects that may undermine the trial's 
fairness, and while taking account 
of less intrusive alternatives, is 
necessary to significantly further 
important governmental trial-related 
interests. Id. The Court pointed 
out this standard may only be 
applied in rare circumstances 
because it implies an important 
governmental interest is being 
threatened. Id. at 2184. The Court 
noted special circumstances may 
undermine the governmental interest 
of timely prosecutions. Id. For 
instance, a defendant who refuses 
treatment, ultimately securing a 
more lengthy confinement in an 
institution, affects a case's efficiency 
because offaded memories and lost 
evidence. Id Such circumstances, 
the Court suggested, may also 
jeopardize a defendant's right to a 
fair trial. Id. Additionally, the Court 
recognized this standard is applied 
only to determine whether forced 
administration of antipsychotic 
drugs renders a defendant com-
petent to stand trial, and if a court 
wants to order such involuntary 
administration on other grounds, 
such as the defendant's danger-
ousness, this standard may become 
moot. Id. at 2185. Before a court 
uses competency grounds, it should 
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consider all grounds set forth in 
Harper and Riggins. Id. The 
Court rationalized that other 
grounds, such as dangerousness, are 
more objective and manageable 
because experts can determine if 
drugs are medically appropriate and 
necessary to control a defendant's 
dangerousness. Id. Moreover, the 
process of balancing harms and 
benefits offorced administration is 
less troublesome when applying 
other grounds in comparison to trial 
fairness and competency. Id. at 
2185. 
The Court concluded the court 
of appeals erred by approving the 
involuntary administration of anti-
psychotic drugs to Sell solely to 
render him competent to stand trial. 
Id. at 2186. The Court reasoned 
the magistrate did not find forced 
medication legally justified on trial 
competency grounds alone because 
experts who testified at the initial 
hearing focused primarily on Sell's 
dangerousness. Id. The failure to 
focus on trial competence was 
significant because it was am-
biguous whether any side effects 
were likely to undermine the fairness 
of Sell's trial, which was not 
necessarily a relevant question when 
dangerousness was the primary 
issue. Id. at 2187. Also, the lower 
courts did not consider whether 
Sell's long confinement at the Center 
or his refusal to be medicated would 
result in further institutionalization. 
Id. 
In Sell v. United States, the 
Supreme Court's decision to allow 
a pretrial order to receive im-
mediate review may open courts to 
an expansive range of appellate 
jurisdiction. Any defendant who 
appeals on the basis of a trial court 
order, which will, if implemented, 
cause an immediate violation of his 
constitutional rights could seriously 
impede the efficiency of judicial 
proceedings. On the other hand, the 
Court's decision reiterates a 
growing concern regarding the 
judicial system's treatment of 
mentally ill defendants. The Court 
recognized the difficult task mentally 
ill defendants face in understanding 
legal proceedings, let alone 
comprehending they have rights that 
cannot be violated without strict 
review. The standard applied 
impacts both courts and lawyers by 
mandating they pinpoint the most 
appropriate means for a mentally ill 
defendant to receive a fair trial. This 
includes forcing courts to consider 
several subjective factors before 
ordering antipsychotic drugs to 
mentally ill defendants who do not 
desire such treatment. Thus, Sell 
v. United States puts Maryland 
courts on notice that if they fail to 
take into account these factors, they 
are blatantly violating the 
Constitution. 
